KEEP ALL YOUR TEXTBOOKS Draft of July 30, 2019 Matheus Silva ABSTRACT Akman (2017) argued that our logic textbooks should be burned, since they present a propositional analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that leads to a contradiction. According to Akman, we should instead adopt a first-order analysis where conditions are interpreted as one-place predicates. I will argue that (1) Akman's argument fails to show that the propositional analysis of conditions leads to a contradiction, since the negation of a conjunction is not a conjunction with negated conjuncts, but rather a disjunction with negated disjuncts; (2) we can still infer a contradiction from the propositional analysis of conditions by negating two propositions individually and using them to form a conjunction that is contradictory; (3) Akman's interpretation of the first-order analysis does not accurately represent most attributions of conditions; (4) a proper representation of most attributions of conditions in the first-order analysis also implies a contradiction; (5) the propositional and the first-order analysis of conditions imply a contradiction because they use the material conditional, but they can be formulated with other conditional connectives that prevent this consequence; (6) we should still maintain the material conditional in both analyses and explain away its counter-intuitive character as the result of an epistemic bias that favours intentional evidence over extensional evidence, and acceptability conditions and criteria of truth over truth conditions. Keywords: necessary condition, sufficient condition, intensional evidence, extensional evidence, material conditional, criteria of truth, acceptability conditions, truth conditions. 1. THERE IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL IN OUR LOGIC TEXTBOOKS The propositional analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that is used in most logic textbooks translates the proposition 'A is sufficient for B' as a conditional 'if A, then B', which is represented symbolically as the material conditional, A ⊃ B. The proposition expressed by 'A is necessary for B' is then interpreted as 'if not A, then not B', which can be symbolised as ¬A ⊃ ¬B, which on its turn is equivalent to B ⊃ A. These two assumptions imply that the proposition 'A is necessary and sufficient for B' should be represented symbolically as (B ⊃ A)&(A ⊃ B). Now, suppose that one asserts 'A is neither necessary nor sufficient for B'. According to Akman, this proposition amounts to the acceptance of both 'A is not necessary for B' and 'A is not sufficient for B', which according to the propositional analysis is equivalent to ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B). This proposition is a contradiction in classical logic, but since it is obvious that one could deny that A is either necessary or sufficient for B without implying a contradiction, the propositional analysis of conditions is surely false . 1 This argument has a flaw. It assumes that the proposition 'A is neither necessary nor sufficient for B' should be represented symbolically as ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B). That this Akman (2017: 378).1 !1 interpretation is incorrect becomes clear once we consider that 'A is neither necessary nor sufficient for B' is the negation of 'A is necessary and sufficient for B', which is represented symbolically as (B ⊃ A)&(A ⊃ B). But the negation of this proposition is not ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B), but ¬(B ⊃ A) v ¬(A ⊃ B), and this is not a contradiction in classical logic. Of course, we can still infer a contradiction from the propositional analysis in a slightly different way. Let us suppose that both propositions 'A is not a necessary condition for B' and 'A is not a sufficient condition for B' are accepted by the same person. Their joint acceptance is represented symbolically as ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B), which again is a contradiction in classical logic. This surprising result is a consequence of the truth conditions of the material conditional. The negation of A ⊃ B is logically equivalent to A&¬B, while the negation of B ⊃ A is logically equivalent to B&¬A. The joint acceptance of A&¬B and B&¬A is obviously a contradiction, since it is tantamount to accept both A&¬A and B&¬B. However, it seems obvious that one can accept that A is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for B without a contradiction. This theoretical shock happens because the negation of the material conditional forces the denier to accept that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, but intuitively we can deny a natural language conditional without making commitments to the truth values of its antecedent and consequent. For example, if we interpret natural language conditionals as material, the negation of 'If God exists then the prayers of evil men will be answered' implies 'God exists and the prayers of evil men will not be answered' . 2 Thus, from the negation of a simple conditional I can prove that God exists. This is implausible because one could refuse the conditional based on assumptions about the supposed moral properties and dispositions of God even if she does not believe in the existence of God. It seems that in this example the denial of the conditional 'If God exists then the prayers of evil men will be answered' does not imply a conjunction, but a different conditional with a negated consequent, namely, 'If God exists then the prayers of evil men will not be answered', whose acceptance does not require any commitment to the truth values of either antecedent or consequent. Akman neglects this counter-intuitive aspect of the material conditional. Instead, he attempts to prevent the contradiction by adopting a first-order analysis where conditions are interpreted as one-place predicates. In his favoured solution, a statement such as 'A is a sufficient condition for B' should be interpreted as 'everything that possesses the property A possess the property B', which is then represented symbolically as ∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx). The statement 'A is a necessary condition for B' should be interpreted as 'nothing possesses the property B if it does not possess the property A', which is represented symbolically as ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax). The idea is that this would prevent the generation of a contradiction since the negation of both claims will be logically equivalent to ¬(∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx) v ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax)), which is not a contradiction in classical logic . 3 This first-order analysis of conditions is a move in the right direction. It provides a more fine-grained analysis of conditions with an elegant use of predicate logic. It clarifies our intuitions by interpreting conditions as properties, and explaining the sufficiency and necessity in conditionality statements as inference relations. However, Akman's use of predicate logic does not accurately represent most attributions of conditions. Akman assumes Stevenson (1970: 28).2 Akman (2017: 379).3 !2 that every conditionality statement involves the use of universal quantifiers, but most attributions of conditions do not work that way. Suppose that I assert 'Socrates being a philosopher is a sufficient condition for Socrates being Greek'. Following Akman's solution, this statement must then be interpreted as 'Everything that possesses the property of being philosopher, possesses the property of being Greek', but this interpretation is too strong, for it seems obvious that I was making an attribution of condition that is specific to Socrates. In a more sensible formulation of the first-order analysis, this statement should be interpreted as 'If Socrates possesses the property of being philosopher, he possesses the property of being Greek', which must be represented without a universal quantifier, i.e., as Aa ⊃ Ba. This qualification is also important because it shows that the first-order analysis also makes use of the negation of the material conditional and thus it is still unsuccessful in its attempt to prevent contradictions. Suppose that I claim both 'Socrates being a philosopher is not a sufficient condition for being Greek' and 'Socrates being a philosopher is not a necessary condition for being Greek'. Taken together these statements will be equivalent to ¬(Aa ⊃ Ba) ⊃ ¬(Ba ⊃ Aa), and thus leading us to (Aa&¬Ba)&(Ba&¬Aa), which is a contradiction. This is not a surprise. If we consider the way in which conditionals and conditionality statements are related, it becomes obvious that it was not the propositional analysis, but the truth conditions of negated material conditionals that was responsible for the contradiction. First, let us consider the way in which conditionals and conditionality are connected. Suppose that A ⊃ B is true; given the truth conditions of the material conditional, it follows that if A is true, B must be true. In other words, A must be a sufficient condition for B. Now, suppose that B ⊃ A is true; given the truth conditions of the material conditional, it follows that if A is false, B must be false, i.e., A is a necessary condition of B. Now, let the natural language conditional be represented as A → B. If we replace the material conditional for the natural language conditional, we can still maintain the rationale that motivates the propositional analysis of conditions. For if A → B is true, it follows that if A is true, B must be true, i.e., that A is a sufficient condition for B, while if B → A is true, it follows that if A is false, B must be false, i.e., that A is a necessary condition for B. If we employ this natural language conditional in our propositional analysis of conditions, the propositions 'A is not a sufficient condition for B' and 'A is not a necessary condition for B' should be interpreted as ¬(A → B) and ¬(B → A), respectively, which on its turn implies A → ¬B and B → ¬A. But notice that their conjunction does not generate a contradiction. If we employ A → ¬B on a modus ponens, we can infer ¬B from A, but then B → ¬A will only allows us to infer infer ¬B from A by modus tollens. On the other hand, if we employ B → ¬A on a modus ponens, we can infer ¬A from B, but then we only employ A → ¬B on a modus tollens and infer ¬A from B. But there is no circumstance where we can infer both A and ¬A or B and ¬B. The same reasoning holds for the first-order analysis, the only difference being that instead of interpreting A → ¬B as the consequence of ¬(A → B), and B → ¬A as the consequence of ¬(B → A), we interpret Aa → ¬Ba as the consequence of ¬(Aa → Ba), and Ba → ¬Aa as the consequence of ¬(Ba → Aa). Since the material conditional is to blame for the embarrassment of an unexpected contradiction, one could suggest that we should abandon the classical logic for an alternative logic that has a conditional connective that is more in accord with our intuitions associated with negated conditionals. That would be a hasty conclusion, however, for there are independent reasons to accept this strange feature of classical logic. !3 2. WHY OUR LOGIC TEXTBOOKS SHOULD BE PARADOXICAL One could try to dismiss this problem by arguing that our common intuitions about the negation of conditionals is just one among other confusions about the negation of complex propositions. For example, a common confusion is to assume that the negation of a conjunction is another conjunction with negated conjuncts, e.g., the negation of A&B is ¬A&¬B. But this is a mistake, since the negation of A&B is actually a disjunction with the form ¬A ∨ ¬B. Following the same line of reasoning, it could be argued that the view that the negation of A → B is A → ¬B is also a mistake, since the negation of the conditional is not another conditional with a negated consequent, but a conjunction with the form A&¬B. The problem, however, is that it seems obvious after careful consideration that the negation of A&B is ¬A ∨ ¬B, instead of ¬A&¬B. This is something that follows from the truth conditions of the conjunction. But the fact that the negation of A → B is A&¬B imposes a commitment to the truth values of A and B that is still implausible after a second thought, since it is intuitively obvious that one can deny a conditional without knowing the truth values of A and B. However, this intuition about negated conditionals is not sacrosanct. In fact, it reveals itself as epistemic bias that favours intensional evidence over extensional evidence . 4 Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth value of the proposition, whereas extensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that involves the truth value of the proposition. That the weather forecast for tomorrow indicates heavy rain is an intensional evidence to think that there will be heavy rain on May 6, while the occurrence of heavy rain in May 6 constitutes an extensional evidence to accept that there is heavy rain on May 6. The fact that some trustworthy individual told me that the last match was cancelled is an intensional evidence to think that the last match was cancelled, while the fact itself that match was cancelled is an extensional evidence to think that the match was cancelled. The distinction between intensional evidence and extensional evidence can be extended to complex propositions. Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a complex proposition that is not the truth value of the proposition, or the truth value of its propositional contents. For example, the fact that there is a known connection between red spots and measles is an intensional evidence to accept the conditional 'if Socrates has red spots, he has measles'. Extensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that involves the truth value of the proposition, or the truth values of its propositional contents, e.g., knowing that Socrates has both red spots and measles is an extensional evidence to accept the conditional 'if Socrates has red spots, he has measles'. The distinction between intensional and extensional evidence is borrowed and adapted from Stevenson (1970), 4 who uses the distinction in a more restricted sense. According to Stevenson (1970: 31), a 'body of evidence that confirms p ⊃ q is intensional just in case it does not confirm the stronger proposition, -p, and does not confirm the stronger proposition, q', whereas extensional evidence is merely nonintensional evidence. The distinction used in this article is more comprehensive, since it is not restricted to the material conditional, but also encompass any simple or complex proposition. The related argumentation presented in this article involving other concepts associated with this distinction (e.g., defeasible and conclusive evidence; acceptability and truth conditions; criteria of truth and truth conditions) is neither advanced or endorsed by Stevenson. !4 Now, notice that natural language conditionals, A → B, can be accepted when the speaker ignores the truth values of A and B. In fact, in most cases we do not have access to the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent of the conditionals that interest us. Besides, when we evaluate a conditional we are usually interested in a connection between the antecedent and the consequent, and the use of intensional evidence is more informative to establish this connection. Finally, the only way of showing that the premise of a modus ponens or a modus tollens are confirmed without circular reasoning is to use intensional evidence that confirms the first premise . No matter how we look at it, the use intensional evidence has more 5 epistemic relevance than the use of extensional evidence for the evaluation of natural language conditionals. This intensional feature of A → B is in stark contrast with the use of A ⊃ B, which is a truth-function whose acceptance involves the assumption of the truth values of A and B, i.e., extensional evidence. If A → B is to be interpreted as having the same truth conditions of the material conditional, its acceptance will require knowledge of the truth values of A and B, i.e., it will require extensional evidence. In other words, what classical logic tell us about the truth conditions of conditionals involves knowledge of the truth values of the propositional constituents, i.e., it requires extensional evidence. This flies in the face of our epistemic practice during the evaluation of conditionals, which often involves ignorance about the truth values of its propositional constituents and the use of intensional evidence. This tension between a logical demand for extensional evidence and our epistemic constraints tied to the use of intensional evidence is the reason why the negation of the material conditional is counter-intuitive, since we can negate conditionals with intensional evidence and refuse the logical consequence of this act when it requires extensional evidence. In other words, we are not inclined to accept a logical conclusion that requires extensional evidence that was inferred from a proposition that was based on intensional evidence. Since we are naturally inclined to favour our epistemic practice that relies on intensional evidence for the most part, we are prone to reject classical logic and its demand for extensional evidence. We have an epistemic bias for intensional evidence that is at odds with classical logic. Thus, any attempt to defend classical logic in the face of our epistemic bias for intensional evidence will have to deny the logical significance of intensional evidence. One way to deny the logical significance of intensional evidence is by observing the contrast of the defeasible character of intensional evidence with the conclusive aspect of extensional evidence. Intensional evidence is used in a defeasible reasoning that supports the proposition, but can be defeated by additional information. The presence of red spots is an indicator of measles, but it is possible that a person with red spots does not have measles after all. It is just a rash. Extensional evidence is involved in a deductively valid reasoning. It is not possible that Socrates had red spots and measles, and still be false that if Socrates has red spots, he has measles. The truth of both the antecedent and the consequent represents conclusive evidence that the conditional is true. Extensional evidence suffices for the truth of a conditional, but intensional evidence only suffices for the acceptability of a conditional, since it is not conclusive evidence. It is also undeniable that extensional evidence always prevails over intensional evidence. Suppose that I assert about a fair coin: 'If you flip that coin, it will come up heads'. But since the coin toss has at least 50% of resulting in tails, there is no intensional evidence to accept Stevenson (1970: 30); Johnson (1921).5 !5 the conditional. Consequently, my assertion was unjustified, which induces you to promptly deny the conditional. But suppose that after this conditional was asserted, I flipped the coin and it came up heads. The result of flipping the coin provides extensional evidence that the conditional is not only acceptable, but true. Your negation was a mistake, after all. Now, imagine that the conditions were a little different, and that I knew that the coin toss was rigged to ensure that the result of the toss will be always heads. Knowing this, I assert: 'If you flip the coin, it will come up heads'. The same conditional would be acceptable in this modified circumstance, since now I have intensional evidence to accept it. But suppose that despite my excellent intensional evidence the result of the toss turn out to be tails (perhaps the rigged mechanism failed, etc.). Again, extensional evidence has the last word on the issue. What ultimately determines the truth value of the conditional are the truth values of its propositional constituents. The predominance of extensional evidence over intensional evidence happens because intensional evidence can vary with time and it is based on imperfect information. But if an epistemic agent were to correct her beliefs given the opportunity, the optimal information will be always extensional, since our intensional based beliefs will ultimately be grounded in facts that determine the truth values of the relevant propositions, i.e., extensional evidence. Thus, the tension between the appeal to intensional evidence in negated conditionals and its classical logical consequences will always be resolved in favour of the later, since the intensional evidence will inevitably have to come to terms with the extensional evidence. Notice that just as our epistemic biases may favour intensional evidence over extensional evidence, they may also favour acceptability conditions, i.e., the conditions where a proposition is acceptable or not, over truth conditions, i.e., the conditions where a proposition is true or not. The negation of a conditional does not seem to imply a conjunction if we rely only on acceptability conditions, but just as intensional evidence is not a proper substitute for extensional evidence, acceptability conditions are not a proper substitute for truth conditions. We should not confuse claims about what is acceptable or unacceptable with claims about what is objectively true or false. One proposition may be acceptable for an epistemic agent due to the intensional evidence available and yet be revealed as false; or it could be unacceptable due to lack of intensional evidence and it turn out to be true. Considerations associated with acceptability conditions cannot be a metric to determine which logic we should use because they rely on the vagaries of our epistemic constraints, whereas truth conditions are determined by matters of fact that are independent of epistemic agents and their epistemic situation. Similarly, it would be tempting to argue that natural language conditionals should not be interpreted as material since the truth conditions of the material conditional are unsuitable as criteria to decide whether a given conditional is true or not. In these cases, we use intensional evidence, not a calculus of the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. But this criticism falls in the trap of confusing truth conditions with criteria of truth. Truth conditions have logical significance for they determine the conditions in which a proposition is true or false, but criteria of truth only have epistemic significance because they are standards used in contexts of imperfect information to distinguish whether a given proposition is true or false, i.e., in contexts where the only evidence available to asses the relevant proposition is intensional. The use of criteria of truth is similar to the use of intensional evidence in the sense that it is fallible, e.g., the testimony of experts is a criterion to decide whether I should believe in a proposition about a topic that is outside my area of expertise, but is a fallible !6 guide since the experts could be wrong. Truth conditions are the circumstances that determine whether a proposition is true or false. Thus, it does not matter that the truth conditions of the material conditional are unsuitable as a criterion of truth in contexts of imperfect information and scarce extensional evidence, since truth conditions are not criteria of truth and should not be judged as such. The epistemic bias against the material conditional is also untenable in different way. It assumes that the acceptance of a conjunction that follows from the negation of a conditional requires extensional evidence, but it is obvious that conjunctions can be accepted on intensional grounds. I can accept the proposition 'The weather tomorrow will be rainy and cold' because I trust in the weather forecast prediction that tomorrow will be rainy and cold. In this case, the evidence I used to accept the conjunction is intensional. An intensional-based conjunction will only require extensional evidence in the sense that once we accept that the conjunction is true, we also make commitments to the truth values of its conjuncts, namely, we also accept that both conjuncts are true. But that is very different from saying that a conjunction cannot be accepted on intensional grounds. This shows that the contrary intuition against the material conditional must be formulated in a different way if it wants to be taken seriously. The most charitable alternative is to interpret the contrary intuition as a belief that the negation of a conditional that is intensional-based does not imply a conjunction that is intensional-based. In other words, the rationale of the epistemic bias is not that A&¬B cannot be accepted on intensional grounds per se, but that the acceptance of ¬(A → B) on intensional grounds does not provide intensional grounds to accept A&¬B. This last resort can also be criticised. If the negation of A → B is motivated by intensional evidence, the additional fact that classical logic ensures us that A&¬B cannot be false when ¬(A → B) is true is in itself an intensional evidence to accept that A&¬B is true, even if the acceptance of ¬(A → B) did not involve any direct knowledge about the truth values of A and B. Thus, the fact that classical logic allows us to infer a conclusion whose propositional components we ignore is irrelevant even on an evidentiary basis. If there is no circumstance where ¬(A → B) is true and A&¬B is false, to refuse the conclusion due to evidentiary reasons only shows that reasoners can be irrational, not that the conclusion is unjustified. Thus, strange as it seems, to accept that any given proposition A is neither necessary nor sufficient for B is to accept a contradiction. If we think any different is because we are accustomed to epistemic constraints that favour intensional evidence, acceptability conditions and criteria of truth. We are biased by our epistemic practices. In this sense, classical logic is no different of many scientific findings of physics and biology that also conflict with our feelings 'of what reality ought to be'. What should this bother us? This is just business as usual. Let us keep our textbooks safe from the bonfire. REFERENCES Akman, V. 2017. Burn All Your Textbooks. Australasian Journal of Logic, 14(3): 378–382. Johnson, W. 1921. Logic: Part I. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Stevenson, C. 1970. If-Iculties. Philosophy of Science, 37(1): 27–49. !